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Using data on Indian government-owned rms, we investigate the
e¤ect of privatization on the performance of these rms. Our results
suggest that privatization is positively associated with the protability
and e¢ ciency of of government-owned rms. Despite the small number
of transactions, selling majority equity stakes to private owners has an
economically signicant impact on rm performance. Moreover, pri-
vatization is not associated with layo¤s or a decline in employee com-
pensation. These results are robust to controlling for the observable
and unobservable characteristics of rms selected for privatization, and
industry and country level reforms.
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1 Introduction
Government-owned rms occupy an important position in the Indian econ-
omy. Federal government-owned rms contributed more than 11 percent of
GDP in 2005 (Economic Survey, 2006-07), and 41 listed government-owned
rms constituted 26% of the total market capitalization of the Bombay Stock
Exchange on March 31, 2009. However, government-owned rms are highly
ine¢ cient due to surplus employment, rent-seeking activities by politicians,
protection from competitive forces, and the absence of market-based incen-
tives for workers. For example, just 158 federal government-owned rms
reported positive prots, while another 54 rms reported losses in 2008
(Public Enterprise Survey, 2008-09).
Following a balance of payments crisis in 1991, the Indian government
undertook wide-ranging economic reforms to reduce the role of the govern-
ment in the economy, including delicensing, foreign investment and trade
liberalization, nancial sector reforms, and privatization. Since 1991, the
total revenues collected from privatization sales is approximately Rs. 625
billion (About $14 billion at the October 2010 exchange rate of $1 = Rs. 44).
Of the 280 non-nancial rms owned by the federal government, successive
governments have sold partial equity stakes on the stock market without
transferring management control in 46 rms, and have sold majority stakes
and transferred management control in 14 rms.
The two privatization methods, partial and majority sales, adopted by
the Indian government o¤er us insight into the long-standing debate over
why government-owned rms perform poorly. First, the managerial view,
based on agency theory, is that government-owned rms have di¢ culty mon-
itoring managers because there is neither an individual owner with strong
incentives to monitor managers nor a public share price to provide informa-
tion about manager actions as judged by stock market participants (La¤ont
and Tirole (1993)). Partial privatization, where the shares of the rm are
traded on the stock market while the rm remains under government control
and subject to political interference, o¤ers a test of this theory. Using data
on all partial privatizations undertaken between 1991 and 1999 in India,
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Gupta (2005) nds that, consistent with the managerial view, the sale of
partial equity stakes increases sale revenues, protability, and labor produc-
tivity of government-owned rms.1
According to the political view of government ownership, governments
pursue objectives in addition to and in conict with prot maximization and
the resulting political interference may distort the objectives and constraints
faced by managers (Shleifer and Vishny (1994)). For example, Fan, Wong,
and Zhang (2007) nd that Chinese partially privatized rms with politically
connected CEOs are more likely to underperform, and appoint less profes-
sionally qualied but politically connected board members. Therefore, only
the outright transfer of rms to private owners will lead to performance
improvements. Indias privatization experience is useful because the In-
dian government undertook both partial privatizations as well as the sale
of majority stakes with the transfer of management control, which allows
us to investigate the political view. In this paper we examine the e¤ect
of privatizing majority stakes and transferring management control on the
performance of government-owned rms that have been partially privatized
and are trading on the stock market.
Using data on the population of privatizations undertaken since the start
of the privatization process in 1991, we nd that performance improvements
are signicantly and positively related to the fraction of equity sold. For
example, comparing privatized rms to rms that have been selected for
privatization but have not yet sold any equity, we nd that a 10 percentage
point increase in the level of private equity would increase annual sales by
3:3%, returns to sales by 3:8%, and net worth to sales by 17%, on aver-
age. Our results also suggest that selling equity to private owners does not
cause the government to abandon the political objective of maintaining sur-
plus employment, as labor and wages do not decline following privatization.
These results are robust to controlling for rm xed e¤ects, average rm
size, industry characteristics, and contemporaneous reforms at the country
1There is a large literature evaluating the e¤ects of privatization on rm performance.
The majority of studies show that privatization has a positive e¤ect on rm performance.
For a recent survey see Megginson and Netter (2001) and Megginson (2005).
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level.
Examining the e¤ect of selling majority equity stakes and transferring
management control, the results show that the sale of majority equity stakes
has an economically signicant impact on rm performance. Compared to
partially privatized rms, we nd that sales and returns to sales increase
by 23% and 21% respectively on average when rms sell majority equity
stakes and transfer management control to private owners. Moreoever, the
sale of majority equity stakes are not accompanied by layo¤s or a decline in
worker compensation. In fact, employment appears to increase signicantly
following privatization.
Despite the ine¢ ciency of government-owned rms, public support for
privatization in India remains low, as suggested by the fact that it is of-
cially referred to as disinvestment. The prevailing argument against
privatization is best captured by a recent quote from a Member of Parlia-
ment: Disinvestment of the public sector is nothing but selling the family
silver to meet the grocers bill,(Times of India, June 9, 2009, DMK puts
spoke in disinvestment plans).2 However, our results suggest that priva-
tization is associated with signicant improvements in the performance of
government-owned rms, and these e¤ects are robust to the pre-privatization
characteristics of rms, indicating that protable rms also benet from pri-
vatization.
Examining the role of politics in Indias privatization program, Dinc
and Gupta (2010) show that rms located in electoral districts where the
governing party is in a close race with opposition parties, and rms located
in the home state of cabinet ministers, are much less likely to be privatized.3
2Ahmed and Varshney (2008) note that privatization has been more di¢ cult to imple-
ment than other policies such as stock market liberalization: Within economic policy. . .
some issues are more likely to arouse mass contestation than others. Privatization, a
change in labor laws, withdrawal of agricultural subsidies... Either a large number of
people are negatively a¤ected in the short run (agriculture), or those so a¤ected, even
when not in large numbers, are well organized in unions (privatization and labor laws). It
should now be clear why Indias decision makers have. . . achieved limited privatization
(page 22).
3There is a growing literature on the political economy of privatization. For example,
Jones et al. (1999) show that governments adopt terms of sale that are consistent with
political objectives; Clarke and Cull (2002) nd that the political a¢ liation of the govern-
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Acknowledging the political cost of privatization one Prime Minister said, If
you face immediate political problems - elections in four states - it is hard
to push ahead. . .We had to worry about the prospects of unemployment
if public sector units faced closure, (Asia Times, April 8, 1997, Indias
Reform Architect Looks On From The Sidelines). However, our results
show that fears of layo¤s following privatization may be exaggerated, and
in fact, government-owned rms that do not privatize reduce workforce size
on average compared to privatized rms.
In Section 2 below we describe the background to government ownership
and privatization in India, Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 describes
the regression results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Government-ownership and privatization
2.1 Government-owned rms
The rst prime minister of post-independence India, Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru envisaged the role of government-owned rms as the commanding
heights of the economy, on the grounds that the nascent private sector
would not undertake projects requiring large investments with long gesta-
tion periods. The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, stated, The State
will progressively assume predominance and direct responsibility for set-
ting up new industrial undertakings and for developing transport facilities.
While on the eve of the First Five Year Plan in 1951 there were 5 federal
government-owned rms with a total investment of Rs. 290 million (About
$6.5 million at the October 2010 exchange rate of $1=Rs 44), in 2009, there
were nearly 250 nancial and non-nancial rms with a total investment
of Rs.5,289.5 billion ($119 billion). We focus on rms owned by the fed-
eral government, which account for about 85% of the total assets of all
government-owned companies (Gupta (2005)), and operate in a large num-
ment does not have a robust impact on the probability of bank privatization in Argentina;
Bortolotti and Pinotti (2008) show that privatization is delayed in democracies with pro-
portional electoral systems; and, Dastidar, Fisman, and Khanna (2009) show that there
is policy irreversibility in the privatization process in India
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ber of manufacturing, service, and infrastructure industries, including steel,
cement and chemicals; capital goods; electricity and gas; as well as services
such as technology, telecommunications, trade, tourism, and warehousing,
among others. The banking, insurance, and nancial services sectors are
also heavily dominated by federal and state-government owned rms.
The inuence of the government on Indias economy is described by
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, In the initial stages of Indias devel-
opment central planning was a positive factor for development of promot-
ing industrialization, of building industries which would never have [been]
built...But the real problem starts after 15 or 20 years, because the central-
planning system that we have evolved and [that] other countries have evolved
lack an e¤ective incentive system to modernize on a progressive basis, to im-
prove productivity, to bring new technology,(PBS Interview for Command-
ing Heights, February 6, 2001). Federal government-owned rms typically
underperform in comparison to private rms in the same industry (Depart-
ment of Disinvestment (2001)). For example, between 1990 and 1998 the
ratio of prots after tax to sales averaged -4.4% for government-owned man-
ufacturing rms, and 6.7% among private rms (Department of Disinvest-
ment (2001)). In 2008, 158 rms reported cumulative prots of about Rs.
986.5 billion, while 54 rms reported accumulated losses of Rs. 144.2 bil-
lion in 2008 ($22.3 billion and $3.3 billion respectively, Public Enterprise
Survey, 2008-09). These rms are typically oversta¤ed, and the average
wages of government-rm workers are twice as high as in the private sector
(Panagariya (2008)), which may indicate why government rm workers are
opposed to privatization. Describing this opposition a news article reported:
Over 25,000 ONGC [Oil and Natural Gas Commission] sta¤observed black
dayand their union leaders went on hunger strike to mark their protest over
the privatisation move,(The Financial Times, 1993).
The total capital employed in federal government-owned rms is Rs.7.9
trillion (about $180 billion at the October 2010 exchange rate of ), and
total employment was 1.54 million workers (excluding casual workers and
contract laborers) (Public Enterprise Survey, 2008-09). On January 2010,
the total market capitalization of the 44 rms listed on the countrys largest
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stock exchange, the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) was Rs. 15.2 trillion
(about $340 billion), accounting for 26% of the total market capitalization
of the 4883 listed companies on the BSE. Taking into account government-
owned banks and regional government owned rms increases the share of
market capitalization of all government-owned rms to 30.9% of total market
capitalization.
2.2 Evolving privatization policy
In response to a balance of payments crisis in 1991, India undertook sweeping
economic reforms that included deregulation and privatization. Outlining
the economic reforms, the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1991 argued for
partial divestiture in government-owned rms in order to provide further
market discipline to the performance of public enterprises(paragraph 34).
However, due to political opposition to privatization, Indias privatization
policy over the last two decades has changed with each government. Be-
tween 1991 and 2004, nearly every governments annual budget declared
that the privatization goal is to reduce government ownership to 26% of eq-
uity, the minimum equity holding necessary for certain voting powers, in all
government-owned rms not in the defense, atomic energy, and railway sec-
tors. However, until 1999, successive governments sold only minority stakes,
sometimes as little as 0.1%, without transferring management control. Par-
tial privatization proved to be a lucrative source of revenues without the
accompanying political controversy of transferring control of government-
owned assets to private owners.
In Table 1 we list the number of privatization transactions and the
amounts received from privatization sales for each year since the start of
the program. Out of 280 non-nancial rms owned by the federal govern-
ment, 55 rms have sold partial and majority equity stakes between the
scal years 1991 and 2009. The privatization program was initiated by the
Congress government in 1991, and after a brief hiatus was continued by the
BJP government elected in 1999. Between 1991 and 2009, total revenues
raised from privatization sales was about $14 billion (At $1= Rs.44). In
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Figure 1 below we describe the annual breakdown of revenues raised from
privatization sales in India since the start of the program in 1991.

















































Figure 1: Privatization Revenues by Year (Dept. of Disinvestment, Govt. of
India).
The ideologically center-left Congress government initiated the privati-
zation program in 1991 and partially privatized 39 rms, some of which sold
equity multiple times. Following the defeat of this government in the 1996
elections, the privatization program remained in hiatus until 1999. The in-
coming government led by the conservative Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
continued the practice of minority equity sales on nancial markets, but also
sold majority stakes and transferred management control in 14 rms. This
represented a major shift in policy from previous governments, although pri-
vatization revenues from strategic sales were about $1.7 billion, less than the
amount raised through partial privatizations (Department of Disinvestment,
2010). The companies privatized through majority sales are listed in Table
2 along with the names of the acquiring rms.
Political considerations may explain why so few privatizations were un-
dertaken by the BJP. In fact, attributing the defeat of the BJP-led National
Democratic Alliance government in the 2004 elections to its disinvestment
[privatization] program, a major newspapers editorial opined, The Indian
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voters. . . were rejecting the National Democratic Alliance [NDA] govern-
ment, which, as one poll slogan had it, stood for the National Disinvestment
Agency(The Hindu, 2004).
After the defeat of the BJP government in 2004, which saw the election
of the Congress party and its coalition partners (UPA), the privatization
program came to a halt. Since 2004, the UPA government, which was re-
elected in 2009, has sold only minority equity stakes in 5 rms. The most
recent Economic Survey (Ministry of Finance, 2008-09) describes the current
governments policy as follows: (1) Generate at least Rs. 250 billion per year
from privatization sales. (2) Sell 5-10% equity in previously identied prot
making rms that are not one of the navratnas, or nine most prestigious
rms. (3) List all unlisted rms and sell a minimum of 10% of equity to the
public, and (4) Auction all loss making rms that cannot be revived.
In February 2010, the government resurrected its stalled privatization
program with a secondary o¤ering of shares in National Thermal Power
Corporation Ltd (NTPC), which owns 20% of Indias power generation ca-
pacity. However, the Wall Street Journal noted that the sale of minority
equity stakes makes this a fund-raising exercise rather than a meaningful
shift toward less state control,(In India, o¤ers fall well short of P-word,
February 4, 2010, The Wall Street Journal).
The lack of progress in privatization since 2004 is mainly due to the
fact that the coalition government required the support of anti-privatization
political parties to maintain a parliamentary majority. For example, the
privatization of Neyveli Lignite located in Tamil Nadu was delayed because
of opposition from a coalition member, the DMK party, which is based in
Tamil Nadu. And the privatization of rms located in West Bengal has been
delayed due to opposition from the West Bengal based Trinamool Congress
party. As noted in a newspaper editorial, It is not that the DMK and the
Trinamool Congress have any deep ideological opposition to disinvestment. . .
these partiesconcern over disinvestment will stem from its likely impact on
the mood of voters in the next Assembly elections...No political party will
like to be associated with any proposal that results in obvious job losses
or relocation of employees and then lose votes in the elections. (Business
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Standard, June 3, 2009, Disinvestment, There is many a slip).
The literature supports the anecdotal evidence. Examining the role of
politics in Indias privatization program, Dinc and Gupta (2010) nd that
successive Indian governments have been reluctant to privatize because of a
potential electoral backlash. For example, rms located in electoral districts
where the governing party is in a close race with opposition parties, and
rms located in the home state of the Cabinet Minister, are much less likely
to be privatized.
3 Data
We observe nancial data for about 213 of the 240 manufacturing and non-
nancial service sector companies owned by the federal government of In-
dia. To avoid attrition bias we do not require the panel to be balanced.
The data are collected by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy
(CMIE) from company annual reports. The data start in scal year 1988,
prior to the launch of the economic reforms of 1991, and end in scal year
2008. Data on privatization transactions were obtained from the Disinvest-
ment Commission of the Government of India, and from the Bombay Stock
Exchange.
Comparing the pre-privatization characteristics of privatized rms to
rms that remain fully government-owned, we note several di¤erences. In
Table 3 we report that compared to fully government-owned rms, rms
selected for partial privatization are nearly four times as large in terms of
sales and gross xed assets, and employ twice as many workers. Firms
that are partially privatized are also more protable and e¢ cient (higher
prots, return on sales, and networth), borrow more, and have lower com-
pensation relative to size. Firms that eventually sell majority equity stakes
have higher sales, lower assets, higher return on sales, fewer employees, and
lower levels of employee compensation compared to rms that remain fully
government-owned. Partially privatized rms are also signicantly larger
compared to majority sale rms. In the regression analysis we control for
the pre-privatization characteristics of rms.
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Table 4 presents before-after statistics for selected performance measures
for partially privatized rms. Specically, using the sample of partially
privatized rms, we compare average performance in the years following the
rst public o¤ering to the average performance of rms in the years before
they sell any equity. We nd that rms experience a signicant increase in
average sales, gross xed assets, prots, net worth, and cash prots after
partial privatization.
In Table 5 we describe before-after statistics for selected performance
measures for rms that have sold majority equity stakes and transferred
control to private owners. The average e¤ects suggest that these rms ex-
perience a signicant increase in sales, asset size, prots, net worth, and
cash prots following the sale of majority equity stakes and the transfer of
management control to private owners. Unlike partially privatized rms,
rms that have transferred control to private owners appear to experience
a signicant decrease in employment following ownership change. Below we
describe the results from the regression analysis.
4 Regression results
A. E¤ect of Private Ownership
We start out by investigating the average e¤ect of selling partial and
majority equity stakes on rm performance, by estimating the following
rm xed e¤ects specication for the years 1989-2008:
yit = i + 1Fraction of Equity Soldit 1 + 2Xit 1 + tY eart + "it; (1)
where yit is the rm performance measure and the Xit 1 variables are rm-
specic factors that explain the outcomes. The main variable of interest is
Fraction of Equity Sold, which ranges in value from 0 to 100: The control
group is restricted to government-owned rms that have been selected for
privatization but have not yet been privatized. The specication in (1) in-
cludes a rm-specic xed e¤ect, i; which reects di¤erences across rms
11
that are constant but unobserved over time, year dummies that would cap-
ture contemporaneous correlation, and a random unobserved component,
"it; that reects unobserved shocks a¤ecting the performance of rms.
To control for other factors that may explain rm performance we in-
clude rm size as measured by gross xed assets, and the Herndahl index
at the three-digit industry level. The latter variable will also control for
confounding e¤ects that may arise due to contemporaneous reforms at the
industry level that a¤ect rm performance. Firm level performance mea-
sures and all variables used in the analysis are described in Appendix Table
1. We note that all the level variables, with the exception of Fraction of
Equity Sold and the Herfindahl Index are in logarithms.
The results from estimating equation (1) are presented in Table 6. We
nd that the share of privately owned equity has a positive and statistically
signicant impact on next period sales, return on sales (ratio of prot be-
fore taxes and depreciation to sales), net worth to sales, cash prots to sales,
total borrowing, and employment. From the rst two columns of Table 6
we observe that a 10 percentage point increase in the level of private eq-
uity would increase annual sales by about 3:3%, returns to sales by 3.8%,
and net worth to sales by 17% on average. Firms also appear to experience
a signicant increase in access to loans following the sale of equity, which
suggests that privatized rms may be better able to nance growth oppor-
tunities compared to rms that remain fully government-owned. Further,
these results suggest that selling equity to private owners does not cause
the government to abandon the political objective of maintaining surplus
employment, and average compensation also does not appear to be a¤ected
by privatization. These results are robust to controlling for average rm size
and industry competitiveness.
Prior research suggests that governments are likely to selectively choose
rms for privatization based on observable and unobservable characteristics.
For example, Gupta, Ham and Svejnar (2008) show that protable rms are
more likely to be privatized. We take a number of steps to address the poten-
tial endogeneity of privatization to rm performance. First, we estimate a
rm xed e¤ects specication that addresses selection bias that may arise if
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more protable or larger rms are selected for privatization. However, xed
e¤ects will not address dynamic selection bias, which may arise if the gov-
ernment selects rms for privatization based on unobservable time-varying
characteristics. To address this, we use the approach suggested by Fryd-
man et al. (1999), who argue that rms that are selected for privatization
are likely to share similar characteristics, so comparing privatized rms to
a control group of rms that have also been selected for privatization but
have not yet been sold should address this potential selection bias. Since
privatization is distributed over several years in our data, in any given year
we also observe rms privatized in later years that form the control group.
To minimize the possibility of simultaneity between privatization and
performance, we use the lagged share of private ownership. The specica-
tions also include rm-specic controls such as rm size and the industry
Herndahl index to control for the e¤ect of industry level reforms that may
a¤ect the performance of rms. Lastly, we include year dummies to control
for contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks.
B. E¤ect of Majority Sales
We investigate the marginal e¤ect of selling majority equity stakes with
the transfer of management control to private owners by comparing majority
sale rms to partially privatized rms. We estimate the following rm xed
e¤ects specication for the years 1989-2008,
yit = i + 1Majority Saleit 1 + 2Xit 1 + tY eart + "it; (2)
where Majority Sale is a dummy variable that is equal to one when
a rm has sold majority equity stakes and transferred management control
to a private owner. The control group is partially privatized rms that
have sold minority equity stakes and are listed on the stock market. The
remaining variables are as described in equation (1). From the rst two
columns of Table 7 we note that sales and returns to sales increase by 23%
and 21% respectively on average when rms transfer management control to
private owners. Hence, compared to partially privatized rms that are pub-
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licly traded on the stock market but are still controlled by the government,
the sale of majority equity stakes with the transfer of management con-
trol has an economically signicant impact on the sales and protability of
government-owned rms. Moreoever, this increase in revenues and prots is
not accompanied by a decline in employment or wages. While wages are not
signicantly a¤ected by ownership change, employment appears to increase
signicantly, perhaps in response to the increase in protability following
privatization.
Despite the small number of majority sales, our results suggest that
transferring control to private owners may result in signicant performance
improvements. One reason may be that partially privatized rms are subject
to political interference, and managers of these rms lack the incentives pro-
vided in the private sector. For example, Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) show
that partially privatized rms in China with politically connected CEOs un-
derperform those without politically connected CEOs, and are more likely
to appoint bureaucrats rather than qualied board members.
C. Evaluating the Impact of Varying Ownership Stakes
Our results suggest that rm performance is positively related to the
fraction of equity sold by government-owned rms. We also nd that trans-
ferring management control to private owners has an economically signicant
impact on rm performance. It may however be the case that ownership
has a non-linear impact on rm performance. For example, performance
improvements may occur only when a su¢ ciently large share of the rm
is privately-owned. In Table 8 we report the results from estimating rm
xed-e¤ects specications that describe the relationship between rm per-
formance and the privatization of 10%, 25% and 50% or more equity stakes.
The results suggest that compared to rms that have not yet been privatized,
selling 10% or more equity in a rm is associated with a signicant increase
in sales, net worth, and employment. In comparison, sellling majority stakes
or 50% or more equity is associated with both an increase in sales and net
worth, as well as an increase in external borrowings and employment. The
e¤ects also appear to be signicant for rms that have sold 25% or more
equity. In sum, these e¤ects are consistent with our results so far suggesting
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that both partial privatization, as well as the sale of majority equity stakes
have a signicant impact on the performance of government-owned rms.
We also estimate but do not report results using a dummy variable for
rms that have sold 5% or more equity. The results are less statistically
signicant. In particular, rms that have sold 5% or more equity experience
a signicant increase in employment relative to rms that are not yet priva-
tized, but there is no signicant association with the protability and other
performance measures.
D. Comparing privatized rms to fully government-owned rms
As a robustness check we also investigate the impact of privatization on
rm performance where the control group includes rms that have never
been privatized and are fully government-owned. The results reported in
Table 9 are similar to what we observe when the control group is restricted
to rms that are selected for privatization, but less statistically signicant.
In particular, compared to rms that remain 100% government-owned, a
10 percentage point decrease in government-ownership is associated with an
8% increase in sales, 4% increase in total borrowing, and 6% increase in
employment, on average.
5 Conclusion
Privatization in India has encountered numerous roadblocks over the last
two decades. Opponents argue that it will lead to widespread layo¤s and a
redistribution of wealth in favor of the politically connected. It has also been
argued that selling protable rms to raise revenues for general government
expenditures does not make economic sense. However, our results suggest
that selling both partial and majority equity stakes is associated with signif-
icant improvements in the protability and e¢ ciency of government-owned
rms. These e¤ects are robust to the pre-privatization characteristics of
rms, suggesting that protable rms also benet from privatization. Inter-
estingly, privatized rms appear to increase employment compared to rms
that have not yet been privatized, while average compensation is not a¤ected
by privatization. Hence, the improvement in protability following privati-
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zation is not accompanied by layo¤s or a decline in worker compensation.
We nd that the sale of majority equity stakes accompanied by the trans-
fer of management control from the government to private owners has an
economically signicant impact on performance. This result suggests that
full privatization may have a greater impact on the protability of rms,
without requiring layo¤s or a decline in worker compensation.
Despite these observed benets, privatization remains a politically con-
tentious issue in India. Our results suggest that fears regarding employ-
ment loss may be exaggerated. Indeed, government-owned rms that do
not privatize appear to be reducing workforce size on average compared to
privatized rms. While there is a potential redistribution of wealth from the
government to private investors, this argument ignores the cost of subsidies
to government-owned rms. However, since the costs of giving up control
will be borne by organized labor and politicians, while the benets, such as
more e¢ cient rms and lower subsidies, are distributed across the popula-
tion, political economy theory suggests that privatization will continue to
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Variable Description Source
Fraction of equity sold Percentage of private ownership. Ranges in value from 0% to 100%.
Disinvestment Commission, Government of 
India and Bombay Stock Exchange
Majority Sale 
Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has sold majority equity stakes and transferred 
management control to private owners Same as above
Fraction of equity sold > 25% Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has privatized more than 25% of equity stake. Same as above
Fraction of equity sold > 50% Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has privatized more than 50% of equity stake. Same as above
Assets Gross fixed assets. Prowess Database, CMIE
Industry Herfindahl Herfindahl index. Same as above
Sales Revenues received from main activity. Same as above
Profit Excess of income over all expenses except tax, depreciation, rent, and interest. Same as above
Return on Sales Profit/Sales. Same as above
PAT Excess of income over all expenses. Same as above
Net Worth Excess of assets over liabilities. Same as above
Cash Profits Excess of income over all costs, except depreciation and amortization. Same as above
Total Borrowings All debt, interest bearing and otherwise. Same as above
Wages Total expenses incurred by the company on all employees. Same as above
Labor Number of workers. Same as above
Appendix Table 1: Variable Descriptions
Year
Number of Privatization 
Transactions
Privatization Revenues (Millions of 
Indian Rupees)*




















Table 1: Privatization by year
Source: Disinvestment Commission of India, Government of India, Disinvestment until 
Now
Company Name Year of Sale Name of Buyer % Stake Sold
% Government 
Equity
BHARAT ALUMINIUM CO.LTD. 2000-01 STERLITE INDUSTRIES (INDIA) LTD. 51 49
CMC LTD. 2001-02 TATA CONSULTANCY SERVICES LTD. 51 32.31
HINDUSTAN TELEPRINTERS LTD. 2001-02 HIMACHAL FUTURISTIC COMMUNICATION LTD. 74 26
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD. 2002-03 STERLITE OPPORTUNITIES & VENTURES LTD. 22.07 49.93
HOTEL CORP.OF INDIA LTD.* 2002-03 BATRA HOSPITALITY PVT.LTD. 100 0
,, 2001-02 INPAC TRAVELS (INDIA) PVT.LTD. 100 0
,, 2001-02 TULIP HOSPITALITY PVT.LTD. 100 0
ICI INDIA LTD. 2003-04 ASIAN PAINTS (INDIA) LTD. 9.2 0
INDIA TOURISM DEVELOPMENT CORP.LTD.* 2002-03 BRIGHT ENTERPRISES PVT.LTD.& CONSORTIUM 89.97 0
,, 2002-03 M FAR HOTELS LTD. 89.97 0
,, 2002-03 LOKSANGAM HOTELS & RESORTS PVT.LTD.& CONSORTIUM 89.97 0
,, 2002-03 AUTO IMPEX LTD. 89.97 0
,, 2002-03 BHARAT HOTELS LTD. 89.97 0
,, 2002-03 CONSORTIUM OF RAMNATH HOTELS PVT.LTD. 89.97 0
,, 2002-03
      
COMMERCIAL PVT.LTD. 89.97 0
,, 2002-03 NEHRU PLACE HOTELS LTD. 89.97 0
,, 2002-03 MORAL TRADING & INVESTMENT LTD. 89.97 0
,, 2002-03 TAJGVK HOTELS & RESORTS LTD. 100 0
,, 2001-02 MALNAD HOTELS& RESORTS PVT.LTD. 89.97 0
,, 2001-02 LOTUS NIKKO HOTELS 89.97 0
,, 2001-02 SANGU CHAKRA HOTELS PVT.LTD. 89.97 0
,, 2001-02 G.R.THANGA MALIGAI PVT.LTD. 89.97 0
,, 2001-02 MOHAN SINGH 89.97 0
,, 2001-02 BHARAT HOTELS LTD. 89.97 0
,, 2001-02 CONSORTIUM OF SUSHIL GUPTA & OTHERS 89.97 0
,, 2001-02 SILVERLINK HOLDINGS LTD.& CONSORTIUM 89.97 0
INDIAN PETROCHEMICALS CORP.LTD. 2002-03 RELIANCE PETRO INVESTMENTS LTD. 26 33.95
JESSOP & CO.LTD. 2003-04 INDO WAGON ENGINEERING LTD. 72 27
KOCHI REFINERIES LTD. 2000-01 BHARAT PETROLEUM CORP.LTD. 55.04 0
LAGAN JUTE MACHINERY CO.LTD.,THE 2000-01 MURALIDHAR RATANLAL EXPORTS LTD. 74 26
MADRAS REFINERIES LTD. 2000-01 INDIAN OIL CORP.LTD. 51.81 0
MARUTI UDYOG LTD. 2003-04 27.51 18.28
MODERN FOOD INDUSTRIES (INDIA) LTD. 1999-00 HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. 74 26
PARADEEP PHOSPHATES LTD. 2001-02 ZUARI MAROC PHOSPHATES PVT.LTD. 74 26
VIDESH SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. 2001-02 PANATONE FINVEST LTD.(A TATA GROUP CO.) 25 26.12
Source: Bombay Stock Exchange Disinvestments Database
Table 2: Majority Sales to Private Owners
Notes: * Sale of hotels owned by these companies
Fully Government-Owned Partially Privatized Majority Sale 
Sales 708.678 2845.367 960.530
(2964.530) (5027.113) (1534.319)
Observations 3434 184 120
Assets 967.9225 5119.361 388.5783
5922.774 9644.651 475.1771
3463 184 119
Profits 188.423 999.779 77.822
(1018.703) (1635.273) (107.370)
Observations 2447 143 107
Return on Sales -0.106 3.629 0.092
(36.698) (23.446) (0.301)
Observations 2303 139 107
Net worth/Sales -98.823 6.200 -0.009
(2240.821) (43.549) (1.734)
Observations 3050 179 119
Total Borrowings 552.453 3226.547 191.838
(2022.717) (5094.346) (229.280)
Observations 3463 184 119
Wages/Sales 1.549 0.098 0.158
(16.561) (0.108) (0.184)
Observations 3296 180 120
Labor 6933.244 14664.720 4348.369
(20951.080) (27568.400) (5476.173)
Observations 3325 187 111
Table 3: Describing Government-Owned Firms
This table reports the mean and standard deviation for the variables defined in Appendix Table 1 for
the fiscal years 1989-2008. Fully Government-Owned are firms that have not privatized any equity;
Partially Privatized are firms that have sold partial equity stakes without transferring management
control; Majority Sale are firms that have sold majority equity stakes and transferred management
control. The average values of the variables for the partially and majority privatized firms are
calculated for the years prior to privatization.
Average Before 
Partial Privatization
Average After Partial 
Privatization % Change p-values
Sales 2845.367 10805.99 279.775 0.000 ***
(5027.113) (29806.370)
184 584
Assets 5119.361 6811.988 33.063 0.075 *
9644.651 (14937.440)
184 582
Profits 999.7792 1468.172 46.850 0.069 *
(1635.273) (3683.147)
143 555
Net Worth 2959.167 3880.826 31.146 0.099 *
5800.712 (9135.844)
184 582
Cash Profits 603.285 1024.316 69.790 0.036 **
1199.385 (2965.332)
170 581
Total Borrowing 3226.547 2247.512 -30.343 0.017 **
(5094.346) (5592.648)
184 582
Wages/Sales 0.09835 0.13655 38.835 0.005 ***
(0.108) (0.191)
180 582
Labor 14664.72 15973.35 8.924 0.296
(27568.400) (29615.930)
187 584
Table 4: Comparing Partially Privatized Firms Before and After Privatization
This table describes the characteristics of government-owned firms before and after partial
privatization for the fiscal years 1989-2008. The variables are described in Appendix Table 1.




Average After Partial 
Privatization % Change p-values
Sales 1990.199 3527.601 77.249 0.001 ***
(3007.656) (4910.548)
188 89
Assets 1069.983 1890.675 76.701 0.001 ***
1739.087 (2682.178)
187 88
Profits 275.3154 640.045 132.477 0.000 ***
(474.550) (1203.438)
174 84
Net Worth 702.833 1656.713 135.719 0.000 ***
1255.697 (2863.319)
187 87
Cash Profits 166.059 451.923 172.146 0.000 ***
317.7558 (848.587)
184 87
Total Borrowing 372.256 450.7316 21.081 0.214
(795.576) (678.146)
187 87
Wages/Sales 0.1314 0.1466 11.621 0.293
(0.160) (0.304)
188 87
Labor 4712.59 2369.126 -49.728 0.000 ***
(5178.654) (3010.993)
178 87
Table 5: Comparing Majority Sale Firms Before and After Privatization
This table describes the characteristics of government-owned firms before and after the sale of majority
stakes for the fiscal years 1989-2008. The variables are described in Appendix Table 1. Majority Sale












Fraction of equity  .0033***  .0387* 0.0144* 0.1775*** 0.0126* 0.009*** -0.0003 0.0058***
 sold (t-1) (0.001) (0.021) (0.008) (0.055) (0.007) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
Assets (t-1) .4845*** `-1.6549*** 0.2906 -2.1831 0.2965 0.5439*** -0.0202**  .2831***
(0.037) (0.549) (0.211) (1.395) (0.194) (0.070) 0.009 (0.018)
Industry -0.0897 ` -5.0757*** -0.2852 -16.2715 -0.16944 0.9391 -0.0046 `-0.2842***
 Herfindahl (t-1) (0.119) (1.739) (0.666) (4.483) (0.601) (0.674) 0.0283 (0.059)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 982 907 907 976 958 919 981 857
Number of firms 52 51 51 52 52 51 52 52
R-squared 0.5367 0.0394 0.0289 0.0472 0.0283 0.1026 0.0313 0.4384
Notes: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
This table reports results from firm level fixed effects (within) regressions for the fiscal years 1989-2008 to estimate the impact of
private ownership with privatized firms as the treatment group and firms that are selected for privatization and sell equity in later
years as the control group. The variables are described in Appendix Table 1. The firm-specific right hand side variables are lagged
one year. Annual Sales, Profits, PAT, Net worth, Cash Profits, Total Borrowing, Labor, and Assets are measured in logs. All
regressions include firm and year fixed effects. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. 












Majority Sale (t-1) 0.2299* 0.2118*** 1.1452* 6.7463* 1.0594* 0.1831 -0.0313 0.2811***
(0.122) (0.080) (0.603) (3.713) (0.548) (0.249) (0.035) (0.050)
Assets (t-1) 0.6424*** 0.0688* 0.6279** 3.8863** 0.6133** 0.6738*** -0.0153 0.4836***
(0.062) (0.040) (0.302) (1.882) (0.278) (0.130) 0.018 (0.024)
Industry `-0.2811** 0.3057*** `-1.2637 `-9.0424** `-1.1559* 0.9022 0.001 0.0442
 Herfindahl (0.139) (0.091) (0.688) (4.252) (0.627) (0.803) 0.0392 (0.055)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 733 698 698 729 728 681 732 636
Number of firms 52 51 51 52 52 51 52 49
R-squared 0.4484 0.0762 0.0503 0.0493 0.0515 0.0597 0.0293 0.6027
Notes: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
Table 7: Privatizing Majority Stakes
This table reports results from firm level fixed effects (within) regressions for the fiscal years 1989-2008 to estimate the impact of
selling majority equity stakes, with firms that sell majority stakes as the treatment group and partially privatized firms that have sold
partial equity stakes as the control group. The variables are described in Appendix Table 1. The firm-specific right hand side
variables are lagged one year. Annual Sales, Profits, PAT, Net worth, Cash Profits, Total Borrowings, Labor , and Assets are 
measured in logs. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Fraction of equity sold 0.1897** 0.9563 5.9761**
 >= 10% (t-1) (0.079) (1.155) (2.959)
Fraction of equity sold 0.1461* 1.9633* 8.2309***
 > 25% (t-1) (0.076) (1.083) (2.854)
Fraction of equity sold .1690* 1.4427 7.5920**
 > 50% (t-1) (0.095) (1.356) (3.578)
Assets (t-1) 0.4759*** 0.4728*** 0.4780*** `-1.4666*** `-1.5662*** `-1.4933*** -1.6781 -2.0675 -1.6935
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.553) (0.556) (0.554) (1.418) (1.426) (1.417)
Industry -0.3912 -0.4673 `-0.5269 -6.1603 `-6.9287 -7.3177 `-22.6779* `-26.415** `-28.4471**
 Herfindahl (0.329) (0.331) (0.336) (4.908) (4.899) (4.970) (12.470) (12.463) (12.649)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 982 982 982 907 907 907 976 976 976
Number of firms 52 52 52 51 51 51 52 52 52
R-squared 0.5379 0.5368 0.5366 0.0308 0.0339 0.0314 0.0355 0.04 0.0359
Net worth/SalesReturn on SalesSales
Table 8: Evaluating the Impact of Varying Ownership Stakes
This table reports results from firm level fixed effects (within) regressions for the fiscal years 1989-2008 to estimate the impact of private
ownership with privatized firms as the treatment group and firms that are selected for privatization and sell equity in later years as the control
group. The variables are described in Appendix Table 1. The firm-specific right hand side variables are lagged one year. Annual Sales, Total









Fraction of equity 0.0075*** 0.0386 2.5175 0.0044** -0.0109 0.0055***
 sold (t-1) (0.002) (0.062) (3.742) (0.002) (0.026) (0.001)
Assets (t-1) 0.4811*** `-2.2011*** 125.9256*** 0.2972*** -0.2328 0.2638***
(0.019) (0.820) (46.561) (0.023) (0.320) (0.013)
Industry `-0.6499*** `-9.8313*** 17.8529* 0.4240* 1.3355 `-0.1953***
 Herfindahl (0.072) (3.235) (182.438) (0.235) (1.199) (0.050)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3937 3039 3706 3688 3935 3180
Number of firms 276 247 275 270 276 253
R-squared 0.3304 0.018 0.009 0.0744 0.007 0.2312
Notes: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
Table 9: Comparing Privatized Firms to Fully Government-Owned Firms
This table reports results from firm level fixed effects (within) regressions for the fiscal years 1989-2008 to
estimate the impact of private ownership with privatized firms as the treatment group and firms that remain fully
government-owned as well as firms that sell equity in later years as the control group. The variables are described
in Appendix Table 1. The firm-specific right hand side variables are lagged one year. Annual Sales, Profits, Net
worth, Total Borrowings, Labor, and Assets are measured in logs. All regressions include firm and year fixed
effects. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
